Another Interlove Story

I am posting this not to shame anybody but to reveal another side to the beautiful religion of Islam that I love.

Jinan and I fell in love and have lived together for a long time. She has developed a relationship with my son. Every night she feel asleep, smiling, with her head on my shoulder. By all accounts, our relationship was one of unique passion, courage, and love.

Jinan wanted to celebrate our relationship by posting our story on the Interlove project. You can read the story that she wrote here:

In that story she celebrates our love and writes that she hopes that her family and friends will some day accept our relationship and that our story might inspire others going through the same struggle to, in spite of obstacles, hold onto love.

Three days ago Jinan went to visit her parents. She never returned.

We left happy, with no relationship problems and we were satisfied with our love and planned to be together forever. She accepted a promise ring from me and wore it to her parents house.

Last night her father stole the phone from her daughter and screamed curses at me. He told me that he would like me to kill myself. In the background, her mother screamed the same. Jinan, when she could get to the phone, whispered and hid in another room. She declared her love for me, declared her wishes to live with me, and to be in a relationship with me. She told me everything I knew to be true. However, she began to repeat the things her parents were saying the background about our relationship: ‘I am not a proper muslim! I am not married to her!’

This morning her phone number was abruptly changed and her Facebook account was deactivated. She can no longer be reached by me. She left myself and the relationship she developed with my five year old son, without so much as a proper goodbye or discussion.

She wrote in her “Interlove” page that she is worried that she will either lose her parents or lose me, and that it saddens her that she is forced to choose when she really wants all of us in her life.

She was forced to choose. And she lost what by all standards appears to be true love.

This is the other side of Islam. This is the dark side of Islam.

I want the reader to understand that I am not writing this as an attack on Islam. I am writing this because I also care deeply about Islam, so much so that I hold it to the standard of being accountable to the words which are written in the Koran. For example, the Surah 24:32, which states that you shall encourage – and not repell – those who are single to get married. They may marry the righteous among your male and female servants, if they are poor. God will enrich them from his grace. By all means, I have always been ready to do that.

Not so long ago, I started a fundraising effort and raised more than $110,000 in funds to help restore a Mosque in Peterborough that was attacked out of hatred and intolerance. Jinan also helped me with that project. After that occurred, I met many Muslims who have become my friends. These Muslims understand and accept the relationship of Jinan and I. And they, I believe, would have helped us to overcome our obstacles.

Last night I called Kenzu Abdella, the President of the Kawartha Muslim Religious Association, for his help. I pleaded with him and begged him to help me find a solution. It is with great regret that I must say that a solution could not be found.

It is my unshakable conviction that what happened to me, so suddenly and without warning, is not Good, and is not right. It is not Islam, and it is not ethical.

Yesterday, my son cried to me: “Where is Jinan? Why is she not here with us? Why did she leave.” My friends, tell me, what is it that I am to tell to my son if the truth is that I can not understand the reason myself, except to say that evil still lives in the most holy of minds.

During my last brief contact with Jinan I learned that her parents purchased for her a ticket to Lebanon. I can not pay her rent for her, and she has moved out – effectively leaving my son and I without a stable home. Jinan will be graduating from Trent University with a degree in Forensic Science and Toxicology. While with me she became increasingly interested in Women’s Studies. She describes herself as an Arab and Muslim Feminist.

She will be leaving for Lebanon shortly after her graduation.

My friends, there is a discourse of tolerance which sustains our faith in the ability of people from diverse backgrounds to unite together in a common struggle and purpose. I am a proponent of this discourse. However, it is precisely because I am a proponent of this discourse that I must state that it also makes possible the concealment of an altogether more insidious fanaticism.

Jinan will now be forced to say all sorts of things to defend her parents beliefs. But this is not Jinan. If you want to know the real Jinan look over all of the memories and letters and artifacts from our relationship, from the time before three days ago – and you will find only love, endless love, and no relationship issues whatsoever. This is a girl locked inside of an apartment, afraid to leave it, and afraid to lose her parents if she does. Her parents have not only locked Jinan’s body inside of a room. They are now locking her mind inside of it as well.

Jinan, who has always loved me and has never claimed to have wanted to be away from me – but who, still when i talked with her two days ago, wanted to live with me and be with me, has disappeared. And for the sake of all that is good and right in this world, I am sharing this story of my intense pain with the world – as Jinan would have wished: to inspire others to hold onto love.

Goodbye Jinan.

[I am sharing this story far and wide, and with the Interlove Project, and others. Because that is what Jinan would have wanted, and because it, right now, is my only source of strength. I am removing comments from this story because I can not bear it..]

The Rabble

Lacan, in a television interview with Jacques-Alain Miller, claimed, in reference to Freud, that psychoanalysis is not for the rabble. By this he could have meant one of two things, or perhaps both: first, that psychoanalysis is not to be practiced by the rabble, that is, in their capacity as analysts, or / and; second, that psychoanalysis is not to be practiced for the rabble, that is, for their collective benefit or elevation.
I want to highlight the fact that Lacan apologized at least twice for agreeing with this judgment. It was an apology to an audience who did not in any way indicate their disagreement, it was a supposed audience or perhaps an anticipated audience. It was an apology said as a solution to the modicum of desire which has not been confirmed; in other words, Lacan went against his desire to say something else. This is an important point. Perhaps at some level the rabble are precisely what is at stake in analytic discourse. This is my hypothesis: the rabble are best suited to become analysts, yet, because they are best suited to become analysts they are what is least hopeful about it.
This explains at least why Lacan went on to state that the problem with the rabble becoming incorporated into analytic discourse has to do with there not being any “hope” for them. In other words, they are without “hope,” which means, among other things, without the appropriate desire. This is the problem: analysts must have hope, but they must also be among the rabble. The rabble are in the position of being the trash of political society. Recall Hegel’s definition: “a rabble is created only when there is joined to poverty a disposition of mind, an inner indignation against the rich, against society, against the government, etc.” In other words, the rabble are what Marx referred to as the “disintegrated mass,” those “thrown hither and thither,” they are those who take from society but never give – what better model could there be for an analyst?
But they do not have any hope. In place of hope, there are hysterical moments of upheaval. In place of political action, there are riots, and disorganized tactical insurrections against this or that place of power. So afraid are they of power that they refuse to allow themselves to be made in its image, they refuse to be located as the trash that they in fact are – and so they seek to become the trash that they are not. The analyst, though, accepts himself as trash without getting off on it – that is, the analyst does not desire the anxiety that arises from being reduced to trash, and neither does he desire to become the model of a future society, but rather, precisely, he desires that he should come to know that which remains a mystery within the core of speech: the unconscious. He desires to know what place he occupies in the discourse of which he is implicate


I am starting to find in Lacan’s work an indication that he anticipated in a remarkable way his later insights on the real, enjoyment, the body, and lalangue as a particular strand of enjoyment from the real. For example, in some of his early seminars he passed over a thought about the enjoyment of the lily in the field, of the painful enjoyment of things in the world. Later, in his 1970s seminars, he drew out these strands and made them central to his analyses. But the important point is that these thoughts didn’t come from out of thin air. They were always there waiting to be thought, from the beginning. The late Lacan was weaving the early and middle periods of his thought.

From Richard Klein’s Facebook Wall


1) Josef Breuer: When confronted with the pseudo-pregnancy of his patient, Bertha Pappenheim, he stopped the therapy and ran for the hills.
2) Sigmund Freud: In his Selbstdarstellung, Freud mentions that when a patient awoke from hypnosis, she threw her arms around him in an embrace. He knew that this manifestation of ‘being in love’ was not to him personally, but was a result of a transference, which is necessary for every analysis.
3) Carl Jung: Sabina Spielrein declared her love for him, so he had an affair with her.
4) Sandor Ferenczi: The ideal for him is to hug and kiss every patient, and then engage in some kind of a ‘mutual analysis’

So we have 4 typical reactions to a positive transference:
1) Flight; 2) a cool objective consideration and detachment, 3) being taken in by the positive transference and having an affair, and lastly,4) by indulging in a love affair with every patient.
The first two reactions are some type of a refusal. The first one being of the particular, the second being a refusal in general or universal. The next reaction is an acceptance in the particular. The last reaction is an acceptance in the general. These 4 reactions could be placed on the Aristotelian Square of Opposition.

Every S is P
Ferenczi’s position: Hug and kiss every patient and then have a “mutual analysis”

Freud: Do not have sexual relation with any patient. Their ‘being in love with me’ is a necessary result of every transference

Some is P
Jung: It’s okay to have an affair with at least one of your patients, Sabina Spielrein, for instance. l.

Some S is not P
Josef Breuer, his patient Bertha Pappenheim, has a pseudo-pregnancy and claims that she is having Breuer’s child. Breuer stops the therapy and flees in great anxiety.

Art & Religion

I was once quite moved by a little known essay by Max Stirner titled “Art and Religion.” In it, Stirner argued that philosophy had as its central preoccupation the destruction of ‘objects,’ while art and religion had a secret solidarity to produce these objects. He wrote: “art makes the object, and religion lives only in its many ties to that object, but philosophy very clearly sets itself apart from both. It neither stands enmeshed with an object, as religion, nor makes one, as art, but rather places its pulverizing hand upon all the business of making objects as well as the whole of objectivity itself, and so breathes the air of freedom.”
In his twenty-first seminar, Lacan claimed that the artists are no different from the religious in that they both fall into an obsessional structure (at least, according to Freud’s writings). He said: “[…] with the obsessional structure Freud was able to recognize what is a single thing: religion and art. I apologize to the artists. There are perhaps some here who have wondered into the audience, even though I find it hard to believe. I apologize to the artists if they hear about this: they are worth no more than religion. It is not saying much.”
Why does he not apologize to the religious? Why does he only apologize to the artists? Are we to believe that the religious are not upset to be likened to the acting-out of artists? I think that it is very important to ask this question because it reveals an important point about the difference between the artists and the religious. Perhaps it is the case that they are the same, except that the artist does not want to be the same. Artists frequently believe themselves to be opposed to religion, and, in fact, they more often than not set themselves up against religion. Or, at least, the artists of the late 20th and early 21st century have set themselves up against religion and the religious.
The artist, like the true mathematician, has as his goal to create the monster – to go there where something that hasn’t yet been invented can be invented. The concern with new aesthetic forms may be the rallying cry of modern and much of contemporary art. Even the most radical shape-shifting artists of the 1970s, the time in which Lacan taught this particular seminar, were trapped within an opposition to the object worship of religion. They wanted to melt the object, to blur its boundaries, to destroy it, and to radically change its meaning or placement in the world.
You can see that what Stirner was doing was in fact positioning himself as an artist … but in the guise of a philosopher. He thought himself somehow capable of destroying the object without recognizing that he all the more eats it. The object he eats is one which becomes for him the foundation of his existence in the world of language: the nothing. Does this not explain why one of the most celebrated pieces of modern art was a black square? Or why one of the most celebrated modern pieces of avant-garde film was a black screen? Or why one of the most celebrated modern pieces of avant-garde music was composed of silence?
Stirner is not nothing in the sense of emptiness, but the creative nothing – the existential nothing – out of which he himself as creator presumes himself capable of creating everything. Thus, it is by positioning the nothing object as an object which is not one that he is all the more capable of uplifting himself to that pretence of self-mastery against which all psychoanalysts intend of exposing the lack in the object aim their praxis. The nothing-object is a screen object which stands in place of and murders the more traumatic “thing.”
The philosopher is often the one who eats the nothing-object so that, all the more, he may avoid the world as it actually is. He replaces himself with the nothing-object of the existential world so that he may posture at being none, at being different, at standing outside of the world, and, finally, at being a self-made man. Perhaps the modern philosopher may be defined as he or she who produces a concept for the thing so that he does not have to actually encounter lack in its radical and terrifying dimension.


From a person who does not fully understand topology. It seems to me that what Mobius and Listing both missed in their definition of the non-orientable surface of the so-called Mobius strip was the fact that it was non-orientable because it detracted from the underlying rules of geometry. For example, Mobius described a projective plane as that which may have within the plane numerous triangles which point in opposite directions when they share an edge. In this understanding, it is the triangle which forms the basis for the “non-orientable” surface. So, if we were to take a rectangle, draw some triangles on it, and then twist the edges to produce a mobius strip, we would find that the triangles do not follow the rule of having to point in opposite directions.

But here there is a problem. First, there is the presumption that the triangle is the standard for the orientable surface. Why did Mobius use the triangle for the standard of defining an orientable surface? This has to do with the definition of a polyhedra borrowed from Euler (v – e + f = 2). And this, of course, has its roots in Euclid’s Elements (definition 7 in book 1, on a “plane surface”). The triangle, though, is a plane surface and not a polyhedron, at base. Although I can not right now think it through it seems that this triangle has in some abstract sense an oedipal dimension of normalization. The oedipal delusion here consists of the belief that at the base of existence there is a trinitarian framework which is orientable.

The trinitarian framework is better understood as already being stretched across the non-orientable surface which includes the Symbolic, Imaginary, and Real, such that it is not flattened or dependent at base upon the imaginary dimension of the plane surface or the triangle. Thus, to describe the mobius strip as a plane surface which is cut and twisted upon itself misses the primordial dimension of the non-orientable trinity. The problem with the birth of the Mobius strip is that it began within the Imaginary or ‘geometral’ dimension, that is, within the imaginary dimension. Thus, even the folding of the rectangle itself was secondary to there already being a geometral plane. Thus, the discovery was itself imaginary.

Early, Middle, Late – Lacan

Isn’t it the case that if you situate yourself within the ‘early,’ ‘middle,’ or ‘later’ moment of Lacan’s teaching then you are already in a sense privileging the imaginary identification thesis of the ‘early’ Lacan – thus to situate oneself in a moment of his teaching is inadvertently to already privilege the imaginary.
To situate oneself within the ‘middle’ moment of his teaching is to emphasize the way in which the imaginary emerges out of a prior symbolic determination. Thus, the middle moment of the teaching emphasizes Lacan as a systematic and structuralist thinker, as a thinker who had a point to prove from beginning to end. Thus, the ‘middle’ period no doubt favours a sense of continuity between the periods, all held together by the work of Lacan.
But to situate oneself within the ‘late’ moment of Lacan’s teaching is to emphasize the universality of the limitations of these moments themselves. In other words, the endless attempt to construct imaginary and symbolic theoretical constructions was itself an attempt to overcome the traumatic contingency of the real.