What follows is a short discussion that occurred on my Facebook wall. I have removed the names of the commentators (they shall be referred to as #1, #2, #3, and so on).
I would like to note four things:
- The discussion seemed to be more energetic when it was related to exciting new developments within the field of psychoanalysis. I note with interest the way in which comments were made more frequently and with less time for thinking at these moments. I wish I could have written the time for thinking that occurred between each comment. And then the discussion was less energetic when it attempted to make connections to fields outside of psychoanalysis, such as philosophy.
- The discussion seemed to end when I announced that I was leaving to teach and that I would like to construct an archive from the discussion. This does not speak to my authority (certainly, it seemed, by all accounts, that #2 was the authority). But it is interesting to note.
- The discussion seemed to pivot around comments that introduced some sort of new understanding (by way of secondary literature).
- The most interesting discussion, and the one that seemed to earn much deserved respect, came from the commentator #2. Commentator #2 slowed everything down by writing at least two large, dense, paragraphs. This, I think, speaks to the importance of injecting slowness into the speed of facebook discussions. In fact, the most productive exchange seemed to be when #2 made an extended reflection.
#1: Traditionally, psychoanalysis deals with two sexuations. These have been defended on the grounds that they refer to modalities of discourse rather than biological attributes. I support this position with absolute conviction – I believe that Joan Copjec has the best popular defense. However, this leaves open the question of the sexuation of the analyst. My current research reveals to me that the analyst has a third gender – something like the god of the kabbalah – which is capable of passing through both sexuations with respect to the analysand’s desire.
#2: (you just moved from sexuation to gender in your argument though).
#1: Thanks #2 – this is a point I should have thought over before typing up so whimsically. Moreover, it’s a point I learned especially from Richard Klein’s work in Lacanian Ink [Lacanian Ink 18, http://www.lacan.com/frameXVIII3.htm].
#3: #2, what would be the difference between gender and sexuation in the Lacanian sense? Is sexuation “on the grounds that they refer to modalities of discourse” meant as some sort of general theory of discourse on par with the four discourses, where a discourse can then be marked as male or female? So then you have biologically male subjects developing female discourse and vice versa?
I remember listening to a lecture of Mladen Dolar about sexual difference and I was very intrigued in a way that he precisely didn’t fall into some sort of postmodern gender relativism, were there are infinite possible sexes and so on.. but started the entire theory on the remark that in the biological Real sense there is simply a + or a -, a presence or absence of an organ, and this belonging to the Real order, not Imaginary. I’m mad at myself that I’m unable to recall or restate his position properly. I’ve never studied Lacan’s formulaes of sexuation properly and have been left a bit disappointed with Žižek’s numerous explanations (sometimes he simply isn’t the kind of didactic that Dolar is able to be)…
#1: #3, While I agree with your overall point here, I think that the traditional understanding of sexuation (+ or -) is still too simplistic. It is not simply a relation to the phallus, but more fundamentally, I think, a relation to the phallic function. The difference surrounds the status of the phallus – what precisely is the phallus? We contribute to a misunderstanding that the phallus is some object when we suggest that it is + (having) or – (not having) the phallus, as a discursive position (is it a choice?, to what extent? And then, of course, we fall into a developmental schema). When we shift to the register of the phallic function we also shift to a position which is more machine-like, in Levi Bryant’s sense – and a position Lacan himself tempted at times in his work. What is the circuitry in which we are enmeshed? To what degree have we been inserted into the phallic function? Are we logically prior to the phallic function (woman) or logically after (man)? It is only as a function of the phallus that we can even speak of the phallus as a signifier, I think.
#4: Brousse says that because there are two identifiable genders (“girl,” “boy”) there are also necessarily 4: “girl,” “boy,” “girl-boy” and “boy-girl.”
The thing we absolutely need to avoid is seeing gender in terms of dual relation, or symmetrical difference. If we see male/female as only different in degree from each other, then we are seeing them in terms of “sameness in kind” (i.e. masculinity), and we see femininity as less quantity of masculinity, like female is 0% and male is 100%. That would be a travesty. Instead we need to think true difference in kind, radical difference that is also asymmetrical, so that it is only perceived from one side — the masculine side cannot perceive true difference in kind, seeing femininity as a lack of masculinity (but same in kind), while the feminine side is capable of perceiving this asymmetrical difference.
The dual relation is always Imaginary, so if we imagine “girls” and “boys” in a dual relation without other mediating terms (like “girl-boy” and “boy-girl”) we fall into quantitative thinking, failing to grasp the true qualitative difference between the two.
I like to think of it in terms of subject position. You can be in the female subject position regardless of biological gender, perhaps what Deleuze called “becoming-woman,” which is many things, accepting one’s own performativity, accepting that there is no ultimate harmony (that conflict or antagonism is at the core of subjectivity) and so on.
I would say that the analyst is not a third position (because there is no position outside of these subject positions), instead occupying the female position in the formula of sexuation.
If we look at it ideologically as Zizek does in THE REALITY OF THE VIRTUAL, the masculine formula of sexuation corresponds to the ideology of the “fall from grace” myth, that society is naturally harmonious and something unnatural from outside of society is attacking it — if we eliminate this outside intruder, we restore harmony. The feminine formula of sexuation is that the conflict is within society itself. To the masculine side, the feminine side is scapegoated as holding 100% of the conflict with the masculine side free from blame, but from the feminine side the conflict is ineluctable. Thus we could say “There is no Left” in the same way “There is no Woman,” there is “Man and women” in the same sense as “Right and leftists.”
I put the analyst in the female position because the analyst is the one who affirms ineluctable conflict, who says “you cannot have satisfaction without frustration, pleasure without displeasure — if something can satisfy you, it can always frustrate you, there is no other way.” So the analyst is the one who subverts the analysand’s “masculine” myths of harmony — “masculine” whether through conscious identification of a male analysand or unconsciously through the animus of the female, if you don’t mind borrowing a term from Jung. Either way, both biological men and women (as well as those who identify themselves as neither biologically male or female) are susceptible to the masculine ideology or Weltanschauung, a perspective from the masculine subject-position.
Here’s a relevant quote which I think supports the idea that leftists/Marxists and psychoanalysts are both on the feminine side of the graph of sexuation.
“Both Marxism and Psychoanalysis are situated within the conflict that they theorize, they are themselves part of the very reality that they recognize as conflictual and antagonistic. In such a case the criterion of scientific objectivity is not supposed neutrality…The criterion of objectivity in such a case is… not neutrality, but the capacity of theory to occupy a singular, specific point of view within the situation. In this sense, the objectivity is linked here to the very capacity of being ‘partial’ or ‘partisan’. As Althusser puts it: when dealing with conflictual reality (which is the case for both Marxism and psychoanalysis) one cannot see everything from everywhere…; some positions dissimulate the conflict, and some reveal it.” –Alenka Zupancic, Why Psychoanalysis?
#3: Notice that I didn’t use the word phallus.. in my simplistic understanding of Lacan (which is primarily from secondary literature) you can speak of the phallus or the phallic function in the discursive sense.
But the whole problem of differentiating between sexuation and gender is that there is also the vulgar biological organ, the penis. So the difference would be precisely the one between the penis and the phallus, where a phallus can simply be a King’s scepter, while a penis would still signify a basic brutal fact of biology.
So my logic of + and – would be the presence or absence of the biological penis, not the discursive phallus. It being something belonging to the Real registory, in the sense of it being a pre-discursive fact, while it’s later inscription into the Symbolic and Imaginary would concern the phallus.
#3: If I rephrase my statement into a (hysterical?) question: Is my understanding in any way compatible with Lacanian theory and formulaes of sexuation or not? Am I simply reproducing a pre-theoretical common-sense perspective due to the lack of reading on my part, or am I making sense in the Lacanian framework?
#4: I think we can say at a biological level there is the presence or absence of a penis, and if you want to notate this + or – we can, but once we start talking about it we have to go beyond the dual relation. Also, the phallus can be many things, as you said — king’s sceptre, or the child of the mother, or even at the Imaginary level, one’s good intentions.
#4: There is also the difference between having the phallus and being the phallus. A “trophy wife” would “be the phallus” of her husband, whereas a mother of a young child would “have the phallus” — so would the mother be in the masculine position then?
#4: I suppose this is why Lacan speaks of the father “castrating” the mother — robbing her of her incestuous dyadic relation with the child.
#4: Not to hijack the thread, but if you want to talk about phallus as Imaginary good intentions, I’ve been looking for someone to help me make sense of this stuff. I get this trope from Deleuze’s book THE LOGIC OF SENSE (1969) which is perhaps his most direct confrontation with Lacan. There is a chapter I actually typed up for a friend, “Good Intentions are Inevitably Punished,” about early childhood development and the identification of the child with the mother’s desired lost object, which would heal her, or restore harmony. This lost object is of course the phallus, and the child identifies as the mother’s phallus through saying, “I’m sorry, I didn’t mean to” — to attesting to a wealth of human subjectivity, discovering that the good intention is itself equivalent in the Imaginary to the mother’s lost phallus or something along those lines. The mother having a “good little boy,” in particular (though the girl could also fulfill this role) is seen as restoring her wounded body to completion. Deleuze has some funny quips in that chapter: “we are all the offspring of divorced parents in the unconscious,” and my favorite (paraphrasing), “the mother is always wounded and the father is always absent.”
Let me know if you want me to PM you the relevant chapter.
#3: I basically agree with everything you said in the comment which appears here just before mine (even though I only got to see it later).
So my “singular, specific point of view” (if I can borrow Zupančič’s phrase) would be that if we keep the distinction between sexuation (phallus) and gender (penis), than gender (penis) comes first, and sexuation is retroactive, an answer to the basic hysteric enigma “who am I (for the Other)?”
If sexuation is retroactive in this sense, this might have implications which would not be so easy to accept for some leftist or LGBT circles, since it would go against the ideology of choosing one’s sexual identity or sexual orientation, but would in a paradoxical way be a form of determinism. If sexuation is a response to some basic (completely contingent) biological fact of the presence or absence of an organ, then the development of one’s sexual identity is simply an answer to something “which is out there”, which can not be changed by a simple shift in discursive practices.
#4: #3, you might be interested in this blog: http://noyau-rationnel.tumblr.com/
“a trans woman’s tumblr about Lacan, Hegel, Zizek, Copjek, Zupancik, Badiou etc. in relation to queer / trans / (rad-)feminist issues” as described by Dominic Fox, who is where I found out about this from.
#2: Hey guys,
I dont think that this question of sexuation in psychoanalysis is really that complicated. Without contradicting #1’s point (which I think its in fact quite standard) nor Dolar (who surely didnt mean + and – as in ‘having’ and ‘not having’), I think we can summarize the situation in the following way. For the psychoanalytic theory of sexuation, there is only one sex: the other sex.
The question here is that of real alterity (real Otherness): what psychoanalysis calls “the sexual” – forget what we think it means, lets start with the “axiom” so to speak – is whatever is a real alterity in the body of the speaking being.
To recapitulate, imaginary alterity is that sort of alterity which is modeled by mirror relations, so whatever it is that i am, the other could also be and vice versa. The imaginary body, constructed according to this form of alterity, will be a body conceived as a perfect continence (a distinction between an outside and an inside), etc.
The symbolic alterity no longer functions in this symmetric/specular way: it is the alterity of a position, an empty place (hence the symbolic as the “third” in a scene, as the other “for whom” we do things/ try to appear in a certain way, etc). It is also an otherness more akin to a function than a representation: an otherness which is not the outside (of the couple inside/outside) but the place from which we can distinguish whats in and whats out. It is, in this sense, a function that gives to certain multiples a value “in” and to others a value “out” (freud touches on this in his text on Negation, from 1925, i think). The symbolic body, that is, the body that supports this function, is surely not a body of perfect contours, it is a body that has no inside and outside per se – it is the body that includes speech itself! It is a nice exercise to imagine which dimension of our body is homogenous with our words – not in their physical reality, in the sense that they resonate simply as sounds, but at the level of signifiers, of differences, etc. No wonder that it is at this level that words affect us. It is a complicated matter, anyway, and Im trying to keep it simple.
So we get to the real body, and then it is a mess. What could a real alterity be and how could we grasp it? Psychoanalysts sometimes quickly say it has to do with enjoyment, and it does, but that leaves me pretty much in the dark in the same way. A good way to approach this, I think, is to take our difficulty as a property of the thing we are trying to understand and simply ask: why the hell are the symbolic and imaginary bodies needed at all???? Something must demand signification (i.e. to be symbolized, and the meaning of the phallic function is, well, meaning!) if there is such a complicated structure of symbolic and imaginary articulations trying to stabilize and locate it. Whatever that is, this is what psychoanalysis calls the sexual. In a way, our question “what is it?” is precisely what it is (it is a real question). This is why the “unconscious interprets”: our unconscious formations are these automatic/autonomous attempts to name the legibility of the sexual as this senseless impasse carved in the body. Now the problem is: why is this different in men and women? (and also: is this the only form of real alterity there is or are there also two forms of “twoness” in the real which are legible as impasses?)
The issue is that (a) it is not different for men and women and (b) it is completely different for men and women. It is not different because the biological fact of having a penis or a vagina says nothing of the sexual as such, and (b) it is different because the difference between the two genitals are like a “real metaphor” for the sexual and there are two logics, which construct whole mechanisms of symbolization and identification, based on the two ways we can relate to this failure. There is such a thing as a real alterity and there is a “real interpretation” for this real alterity in the contingent trait which nature in all its stupidity ended up producing, that we are born with one of two genitals. This is the really difficult part, because it requires us to consider that there is something like a first attempt at giving meaning to the sexual by something which is completely alien to us – nature itself (it is another way of saying that language is “out there”, the first trait of language is not a naming of the world, but how nature by mistake produced an attempt at naming within itself). It is ridiculous not to consider the biological trait as real, but it is also important not to confuse the contingent with the impossible. The impossible is the sexual as such (impossible in the following sense: it has no meaning, if i give meaning to it, than “it is not it”, since “having no meaning” is part of what it is!), the contingent is the biological (it is contingent and meaningless that i was born with this or that set of chromosomes, and equally contingent if in the future someone’s parents can decide ahead of time what sex he/she will have be before he/she is born). And gender is more like the possible (it is possible that the contingent fact of biology has nothing to do with who I actually am and how i enjoy.) This shift from the sexual to the sexual mark – from the legibility of a real alterity to the contingent, but real, marker of a biological difference – is the metaphorical failure which moves and entangles the two other registers: if it fails, then there is something demanding to be localized (signified), hence the symbolic, phallic function – and if this something is localized, then there is the question of where it is in relation to me (the imaginary inside/outside etc).
The formulas of sexuation developed by Lacan are a way to spell out two possible logics regarding this real alterity and the speaking being: there is this failed “interpretation” of contingency to make sense of the sexual – do we substitute this first failure for another metaphor or do we take this failure to be the metaphor itself? That is, do we create a symbolic operator (better than the crappy natural one) to distinguish what is the One and the Other sex, or is this failure enough to mark the (real) Otherness of sex? This is what grounds that idea that, for men, women are the Other sex (men would be the One sex, in opposition), and for women, women also are the Other sex (so its an Otherness that cannot be assumed, we cannot interpellate ourselves, as women, to assume it directly, it remains Other to that – hence why subjectivity proper is feminine!) – its a position which experiences its own sex as Other (an Other without a corresponding One, the One is here, like for a man, produced at the symbolic, not at a real level – which also means that the Other is only configured as Other in relation to the One of the phallic function… there is no experience of the Other sex as Other sex without the symbolic marker in opposition to which the Other sex appears as this incommensurable Otherness). Anyway, this is quite confusing, but i hope it helps.
With all this said, the question “what is the sexual position of the analyst AS ANALYST” seems to have one of two possible answers: either it is the feminine – but this is only partially correct, because to make a semblance of the sexual, to place oneself in such a way in regards to someone’s speech as to bring into play the legibility of the sexual and how one’s unconscious tries to signify it, is not the same as enjoying the phallus from the standpoint of the Other sex. It is definitely a work which deals with this “real alterity”, but there is more to real Otherness than that (i hope to have shown). The other possible answer is that the question makes no sense – at least no more sense that the question of the sex of the mathematician “as mathematician”. But I havent given this much thought and would love to understand #1’s position a bit better.
#3: #4, And yes, you can send me the chapter, even though I don’t like Deleuze, I’m interested in that book. (a case of desire is the desire of the other) And yes, I’ve noticed the irony of how according to the post where you quote Zupančič in the end my interpretation in this very exchange is basically a masculine reading. I completely forgot the crucial point about asymmetry which you pointed out.
#1: Thanks #2 — I’m trying to tease out all of the distinctions that you’ve made here. Some of them are really a different shade for my reading, but it really seems to hang together well. My position is probably very naive: the Other is not simply a symbolic relation – it is a place, which can be located through the relation. In this sense, I’m not sure I can yet get behind the statement that there is only one sex, the other sex. This is true from the perspective of the analysand but not the analyst. For the analyst, the other sex shifts from analysand to analysand, and at different times of treatment. So, the other sex can not simply be the only sex. The other sex, and the Other as such, is a relation drawn from the analyst to the analysand. This is probably the foundation upon which my claim about the analyst as a function of sublimation – always in relation to the other sex – means that sexuation changes. There are different ways of not relating to the other sex.
All of the other stuff brings about a lot of muddiness and I’m trying to follow (with great interest) what you are all writing. Very happy with the discussion and I hope you all continue to have it. I’ll follow along as best I can.
#3: #2 introduced the problem of meaning into this discussion. But he didn’t mention (which I presume is a crucial point in this discussion) that phallus is an empty signifier. I’m pretty sure that’s a direct quote of Lacan… so could I say that phallus is the ultimate master-signifier?
And I totally agree with the line of thought that “for men, women are the Other sex (men would be the One sex, in opposition), and for women, women also are the Other sex”.
And a digression: the funny thing about Slovene language is that the big Other is translated as “veliki Drugi”, but a specific to the Slovene version here would be that “drugi” also means “second” in the counting sense. So your development of the One and the Other would translate into Slovene also as the First and the Second. So in a weird way this contingent linguistic detail basically supports your interpretation on the level of translation itself. But my problem here would be that when dealing with the philosophical topic of the One (Mao’s One divides into Two, Žižek’s One is split, inconsistent… etc. would Badiou’s version tantamount to One doesn’t exist, there are only multiplicities?) I’ve always read it as a discussion about the big Other, not a discussion about the Subject.
#4: #2, your comment is wonderful and I’ve already read it 1.5 times and working my way through again, before I can say anything potentially intelligent in response.
The idea, “There is only one sex, the other sex” –very quotable, but I worry that it desexualizes the masculine position. I think there is something absolutely other about femininity — not just other to the masculine side, but other even to others in the feminine side. Femininity is other to both itself and to masculinity, whereas masculinity is only other for femininity.
The mother is the first other, the (m)other. Male children see the mother as other and father as same. Female children see both mother and father as other, as different. We might say at this point that the identification with father as “same” by male children is at the level of the Imaginary, and this may be the case, but it is no less effective on that account.
The asymmetrical difference between sexes can even be seen in this asymmetrical difference between parents-son and parents-daughter. The son identifies with one of the parents and sees the other parent as “other,” where the daughter sees both parents as “other.”
The way Zizek explains this difference in REALITY OF THE VIRTUAL is as a meta-difference — it’s not a simple difference between male/female, but rather, two different perspectives or Weltanschauungs about what that difference actually is. From the male perspective, the difference is a simple dual relation, but from the female perspective it is not at all this relation of Imaginary duality and is actually the redoubled difference-in-kind between seeing-as-Imaginary-duality and seeing it as it really is, the impossibility of sexual relationship, the ineluctable radical antagonism or split.
#3: #4, Jonah, he already said it himself “for men, women are the Other sex (men would be the One sex, in opposition), and for women, women also are the Other sex”. So who are you arguing against?!
#3: ## I just noticed you’re the evil perpetrator that did the Badiou transcription before I got the chance to do mine with Che as announced… prepare for revenge! As soon as a HD recording of that talk appears, I’ll make a new, more precise transcription, and then go everywhere trying to convince people why mine is simply better. And the title, critique of critiques! Horror! He wasn’t doing a meta-criticism of critique as such, which is why my title “An Introductory Lecture to the Notion of Critique” is far more accurate and relevant! Ha! I just won a small narcissistic point, good for me.
##: Don’t be so easy on yourself, I didn’t see your announcement. I did the transcription to satisfy my own narcissism. I learn better when I transcribe Badiou’s lectures. It forces me to slow down.
#4: You’re right, #3, #2 and I appear to saying the same thing. I’m re-reading his comment again — good stuff, should be in an essay somewhere.
Could you expound on your view #1? I’m curious about the stakes here. Is it about how what role the analyst plays in the initial transference, as the adored or hated other to the analysand, or the subject-supposed-to-know? In which case, the analyst would have to subvert or unsettle this dynamic, to help the analysand appreciate “the Other does not exist” — that there is nobody who “really knows,” nor is the love or hate of the other in transference because of any positive qualities in that person, but rather the subject position they occupy.
I have trouble following your terms because you bring things without definition.. why are “places” less symbolic than “relations”?
Second, I would need to understand what do you mean by “the other sex shifts” in analysis. What shifts in transference is surely not the real… right? I would like to understand why the question of the sexual in the desire of the analyst is important to you, what is the problem you are dealing with that requires this hypothesis? Sexuation is inherently connected with the contingent mark of the body, though not reducible to it. The sexual is the impossible point of “absense” (Lacan, always with the cool puns) in sexuality which is neither one of the two sexes, but which is also NOT ANOTHER SEX. I still would like to get a better definition of the distinction between gender, (biological) sexes and the sexual in what you are proposing before analyzing the position of the analyst regarding the sexual.
I definitely agree with you that there is a big clinical problem today – at least I face it in some difficult cases – where the question of proposing a master signifier to an analysand appears as a necessary thing. A mother whose son is about to go into drug trafficking – it is not the moment to simply remain there and interpret this on the basis of the semblance of enjoyment (“hm, you are trying to control your son’s life in order to remain attached to him bla bla bla”), it might be the case that one has to put a step down and intervene in a different way. Unfortunately, the current overabundance of places simply saying that the analyst is always feminine sometimes makes it seem like the analyst, occupying a position of pure heterogeneity, could never produce an empty signifier (like a “no!” in this case) which would interdict enjoyment, otherwise that would mean going from this real alterity back to a position of mastery etc. So it is a serious problem, because at least where I work we need to, well, man up! sometimes. And the question of the relation of the analyst to the sexual is interesting in the sense that it might give us elements to propose a way to intervene at the level of the One without having to assume that at that point no analysis is taking place. But it is a difficult question, full of possible deviations.
#1: #4, Well, you are all poking holes in my understanding. Thank you for that. It is a struggle to learn, as you know. And I am learning. My point is that, for the Analyst, there are two major positions that matter in front of him: obsessional neurosis (always with a hint of hysteria), otherwise known as the left side of sexuation; and hysterical neurosis, otherwise known as the right side. For the analyst it is important to know that the other is always the other sex, I get that now – which is really just an intellectual point. But it is more important, to begin with, to know how it is that the two neurotics themselves understand the other sex. If analysts can’t understand that point then they can not begin to approach the truth that you all quite nicely agree about (re: the only other sex).
That the phallus is an empty signifier means only that it is not ascribed a (a signifying) value – but thats precisely because it is the very function which ascribes values (in/out, pleasurable/not pleasurable) to other signifiers. This dialectics of empty signifier/chain of signifiers/signifieds can be found throughout Zizek’s work, explaining this is more detail.
What #3 said.
It is not a matter of desexualizing the masculne position. Specially because there is no “sexuality” at the level of either one of the two sexes. There is one sex, the feminine sex, which is a self-different negativity. The one One sex, is already an answer to this previous impasse, and the Other sex as a discernible position is only locatable through the production of this One (masculine) sex. This is why the “sexualization” (in the sense of production of an intersection between signifier and enjoyment) of the feminine happens through the phallic function even though the Other sex preceedes it.
#4: Now who wants to reconcile this idea of the phallus as empty signifier with Meillassoux’s speculative analysis of the meaningless sign? <http://oursecretblog.com/txt/QMpaperApr12.pdf>
#4: #2: Awesome, thank you much for this response.
#2: Sounds like a futile exercise. We should be more careful not jumping from psychoanalysis to other fields without making the proper (philosophical) steps….
#4: Yes, so who wants to make the proper steps…
I only mention Meillassoux because I thought of the ‘necessity of a meaningless signifier in order that we could have meaning’ as being similar to the necessity of an empty signifier that is not ascribed any value because it is the thing itself that ascribes value.
#1: I think the point has already been made and it’s starting to get tired, isn’t it? This doesn’t mean that I find it disagreeable, but the interesting point for me would concern the necessity of this violent passage from non-meaning to meaning. Where can I read more about that?
#4: In the PDF linked above, #1!
##: sidebar: I hope you all keep discussing these things, please do. I have to go teach a class, but I hope there will be something waiting for me when I get back. I also hope you will allow me to pseudonymously collect everything you’ve written here for my records.
###: I’m fine with it! Funny you mention that because I was just talking to ## about it in chat. I did this last week and asked everyone permission, and they were all OK with it:
(transcript of a thread on Levi Bryant’s facebook wall)
#3: #2, I’m going to go look for the recording of the Slovene lecture where Dolar dealt with sexual difference specifically and then try to quote him properly… I think I haven’t done justice to his position. It was too long ago for me to remember it properly
#2: Well, I learned this from the troika, so whatever it is that I said, it was probably better said by Dolar himself!